Great. I have submitted a complaint to ISO regarding 90012015 certification of the Kitepower venture while its still covering up open Safety questions in the aftermath of the Valkenburg Mishap.
You didn’t think that being more upbeat and welcoming of the progress they’ve had to make was appropriate?
It is terrific progress to have an ISO third-party complaint process to appeal to. What is not really progress is that Kitepower likely only bothered with ISO in order to secure Dutch Military contracts-
Dick move. They published a report and there was also a paper published on the issue though they didn’t cite it.
Presuming you are not referring to the AWE Military Moratorium debate, dating back many years.
The Kitepower Mishap Report does not document disposition of the tether during and after runaway, and many other safety-critical particulars. The TUD AWE safety paper was a very belated partial effort, without the long-established rigor of Aviation Safety Culture norms (see TACO 2011*). NASA’s Helios Mishap Report is our best-practice model for comparison.
AWES Safety to ISO/TC 20 standards will be a long exacting process, starting…now.
As much as I don’t like the way Dave goes about things… It would be best we all knew more of the why. By means of publishing.
Why would the kite be going full speed at the end of the line?
Still and all iso9001
Way fancier than Windswept so far
Its quite possible the dragging tether caught on something in Valkenburg; thus the kite could develop full power and speed in a final dive. We know the system software had already failed in exception handling, and may not have acted to minimize further risk.
Noting that AWES performance will ultimately be certified under IEC Wind Energy Standards. There is considerable IEC (and other applicable standards) overlap with ISO. Now is the time for us to define standards unique to AWES, to layer on top of existing standards for similar systems.
This 6 pages report is well documented and is a progress in AWE field.
The Kitepower document is not an independent third-party investigation report, under standard aviation mishap reporting guidelines, and its missing a lot of key evidence willfully withheld by Kitepower management. That’s not conformance to ISO management standards.
Its important not to give up on mishap investigations, until they approximate best-practice knowledge-sharing. Successful AWE R&D must meet or exceed existing aviation safety culture norms. This has been called the “no shortcuts” doctrine on the Old Forum.